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It is common knowledge that Adam Smith, 
the acknowledged father of Economics as 
we know it, had written The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759) before he wrote The Wealth 
of Nations (1776). More sophisticated students 
of Economics today would also know that Adam 
Smith held the Chair in Moral Philosophy from 
1752, after a year as Professor of Logic, at 
Glasgow University. Therefore, that Economics 
has evolved from moral philosophy, and has 
affinity by birth with it and therefore is a moral 
science, should not surprise anyone.
Yet, the analysis of the interaction between 
Economics and moral philosophy, or perhaps 
simply morality, has raised interesting issues 
over time. In the following, I concentrate on a 
few salient ones today.
I. Positive and Normative Analyses
First, if Economics is to advance the public 
good, we must have two prior conditions satisfied: 
we must have scientifically compelling “positive” 
economic analysis and we must have an agreed 
yardstick, what we call “normative” criteria, with 
which we use that positive analysis to choose 
public policy that advances the public good.
The former task has been the main reason 
why Economics branched out as a separate dis-
cipline from moral philosophy whose principal 
preoccupation naturally was with the latter task. 
Economics has been evolving continually, of 
course, in its main task of illuminating the work-
ing of the economy.
That it is essential before normative analysis 
does not mean, of course, that it can unambigu-
ously help the policymaker. Thus, recall the 
famous witticism that if there are six  economists, 
there are seven opinions (and, when directed 
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against John Maynard Keynes, the punch 
line was that Keynes held the two opinions). 
Douglas A. Irwin (1989, p. 45) has recalled 
how Sir Robert Peel, who repealed the Corn 
Laws in 1848 to usher in unilateral free trade in 
England, lamented, despite his love of “politi-
cal economy” (as Economics was called then), 
that Peel found only confusion and dissension 
among the leading economists of the day on the 
Corn Laws’ effect on wages, profits and rents:
“The very heads of Colonel Torrens’s 
chapters are enough to fill with dismay 
the bewildered inquirer after truth. These 
are literally these—‘Erroneous views 
of Adam Smith respecting the value of 
Corn’, ‘Erroneous doctrine of the French 
economists respecting the value of raw 
produce’, ‘Errors of Mr. Ricardo and his 
followers on the subject of rent’, ‘Errors 
of Mr. Malthus respecting the nature of 
rent’, ‘Refutation of the doctrines of Mr. 
Malthus respecting the wage of labour.’”
The normative leg of Economics, coming 
more directly from moral philosophy, has been 
generally based on utilitarianism from the time 
of Jeremy Bentham (1776, 1780). While this 
has generally meant that economists typically 
work with social utility functions whose argu-
ments are goods and services, there have been 
important qualifications. In particular, we owe 
to Roy Harrod, the pioneer with Evsey Domar 
of growth economics and biographer of Keynes, 
the extension to “process utilitarianism,” which 
says that we derive utility not merely from out-
comes but also from the process by which we 
reach the outcome. Thus, many find it distaste-
ful to have a market for adopting babies even 
though it may produce an efficient outcome; 
and I have noted in Bhagwati (1998) that Judge 
Richard Posner’s advocacy of such a market 
may well cost him a seat on the Supreme Court. 
Again, international economists such as Harry 
Johnson, T. N. Srinivasan, and myself have 
actually dealt with “noneconomic objectives,” 
where we modify the utility function also to 
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 incorporate  self-sufficiency and a target level of 
import-competing production to figure out the 
best ways to arrive at optimal policies.
I might add that to get public policy, and hence 
the pursuit of the public good, right, the policy-
maker has to get both the positive and normative 
elements right. Thus, I have argued in Bhagwati (2007) that the philosopher Peter Singer of 
Princeton University gets foreign aid policy 
wrong, not because he is a utilitarian, which I 
believe is a correct welfare criterion, but because 
he gets his economic analysis wrong by buying 
into the technocratic notion, advanced by econo-
mists such as Jeffrey Sachs who wrongly dismiss 
concerns about the efficacy of aid as reactionary 
and reprehensible instead of confronting them 
with evidence and argumentation, that aid is 
 necessarily ameliorative of poverty. Good policy 
has to walk on both legs, positive and normative, 
and both have to be sound and strong.
II. Economics, Self-Interest, and Morality
Economics has also been handicapped by 
the notion that it deals with self-interest when, 
in fact, as even Adam Smith recognized in the 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, man does not live 
by self-interest alone. In fact, as Rabbi Hillel 
remarked, “If I am not for myself, who will be? 
And if I am not for others, who am I?” So, why 
is Economics concentrated on self-interest as the 
driver for economic analysis?
One defense has been to argue, as did 
Sir Dennis Robertson of the University of 
Cambridge, that Economics deals with man’s 
“basest motive,” self-interest, to devise an insti-
tutional framework which would lead those 
who work from self-interest to produce public 
good. This is indeed how Adam Smith him-
self described what he had done, showing how 
people producing for private profit would none-
theless be guided by the Invisible Hand of the 
market to desirable outcomes.
Given the centuries-old Christian tradition 
which deprecated self-interest or greed or self-
love in ascending orders of moral turpitude, 
this was a remarkable turnaround and would 
lay the groundwork for many such as Voltaire, 
most eloquently in 1734, to celebrate the work-
ing of markets as conducive to public good, as 
beautifully discussed by the historian Jerry Z. 
Muller (2002) in his classic work on capitalism 
in Western thought.
Indeed, Adam Smith’s paradoxical demon-
stration that private greed would produce public 
good, under the conditions of the marketplace, 
was what gave him the recognition that all para-
doxes that overturn conventional wisdom will 
produce. In the same way, any claim that altru-
ism would be beneficial will sink into oblivion. 
But if you demonstrate instead that “the road 
to hell is paved with good intentions,” that will 
give you fame!
But the notion that markets, promoted by 
Adam Smith and by his demonstration of the 
paradox of self-interest, would undermine 
morality, was a different, if related, objection. 
It has in fact proven remarkably resilient. It has 
in fact been revived with gusto by opponents of 
markets and mainstream Economics after the 
current financial and macroeconomic crisis. The 
filmmaker Oliver Stone who produced the 1987 
film, Wall Street, which immortalized Gordon 
Gekko as the symbol of markets and greed, has 
produced a 2010 sequel, Wall Street: Money 
Never Sleeps.
Interestingly, the Seven Deadly Sins, immor-
talized in 1933 in the Paris production of 
Brecht’s ballet composed and directed by Kurt 
Weill and choreographed by George Balanchine, 
have never put Greed at the top of any of the 
many lists compiled; but the current crisis seems 
to have elevated it to the pride of place!
But is it really plausible to assert that markets 
undermine morality? I have argued, in Bhagwati (2009), that I find the notion that markets cor-
rupt our morals, and determine our ethical des-
tiny, to be a vulgar quasi-Marxist notion about 
as plausible as the other vulgar notion that own-
ership of the means of production is critical to 
our economic destiny. The idea that working 
with and within markets fuels our pursuit of self-
interest is surely at variance with what we know 
about ourselves.
Yes, markets will influence values. But, more 
importantly, the values we acquire elsewhere 
determine how we behave in the marketplace. 
The Dutch burghers used their wealth from com-
merce to exercise what I call Personal Social 
Responsibility: they spent the moneys they 
made, not on themselves, but on good works. 
The Jains of Gujerat (from whom Mahatma 
Gandhi drew his inspiration) did likewise.
Again, the Belgian economist Andre Sapir has 
argued that there are different forms of  capitalism 
in the world today, reflecting  different cultures 
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and values. The Scandinavians have an approach 
to capitalism that differs from that in the United 
States, for example: the former is more egalitarian 
in outcomes whereas the latter is more focused on 
ensuring equal opportunity. So, where do we get 
our values and how do we confront the phenome-
non of Bernard Madoff and others? I have argued 
in Bhagwati (2008, 2009) that:
“[Our] values come from our families, 
communities, schools, churches, and 
indeed from our religion and literature. 
My own exposure to the conflicts of abso-
lute values came initially from reading 
Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, 
wherein Sofya Semyonovna Marmeladov 
turns to prostitution to support her family. 
My love of the environment came from 
reading Yasunari Kawabata’s famous 
novel, The Old Capital, which purports a 
harmony between man and nature, rather 
than the traditional Christian belief that 
nature must serve man.”
How does one react then to a phenomenon like 
Bernie Madoff? Does it not represent the corro-
sion of moral values in the marketplace? Not 
quite. The payoffs from corner-cutting, indeed 
outright theft, have been so huge in the financial 
sector that those who are crooked are naturally 
drawn to such scheming. The financial markets 
did not produce Madoff’s crookedness; Madoff 
was almost certainly depraved to begin with.
Then again, in contradiction of the claim that 
markets undermine morality, there is also a sub-
stantial and fascinating literature, as illustrated 
by the writings of the sociologist Allan Silver (1997), which argues ingeniously that markets 
enhance morality. Silver has argued that the 
impersonal relations in the marketplace replaced 
the personal relations of the earlier society and 
polity; and that the moral quality of personal 
relationships which had earlier been oriented 
to calculation and interest was now enhanced 
because it was now freed from practical neces-
sity, calculation, and the anxieties of betrayal. 
In this view, the oft-repeated notion that The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments should be regarded 
as a “corrective,” and a supplement, to The 
Wealth of Nations—that “capitalism requires 
morality”—is incorrect. Rather, the former 
work describes the morality that Adam Smith’s 
“ commercial society” of impersonal transac-
tions brings about.
Again, it is interesting to observe that John 
Stuart Mill (1848) argued for a favorable moral 
impact from markets via the freeing of inter-
national commerce (which, in fact, was also 
central to the evolution of Economics since anti-
mercantilism was at the heart of The Wealth of 
Nations, and indeed to John Locke’s earlier writ-
ings). Thus witness his forthright argument:
“The economical advantages of com-
merce are unsurpassed in importance by 
those of its effects, which are intellectual 
and moral. It is hardly possible to over-
rate the value, in the present low state of 
human improvement, of placing human 
beings in contact with persons dissimilar 
to themselves, and with modes of thought 
and action unlike those with which they 
are familiar … There is no nation which 
does not need to borrow from others, not 
merely particular arts or practices, but 
essential points of character with which 
its own type is inferior … It may be said 
without exaggeration that the great extent 
and rapid increase in international trade, 
in being the principal guarantee of the 
peace of the world, is the great permanent 
security for the uninterrupted progress of 
the ideas, the institutions, and the charac-
ter of the human race.”
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